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SMALL EMPLOYERS AND GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE: SHOULD

ERISA

APPLY?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Employers usually find it necessary to offer health insurance benefits
to their employees in order to attract and retain those employees. For
a small employer,' often the only practical means of meeting this need
is to purchase a group health insurance policy from an insurance company (as opposed to establishing a self-funded plan). Problems arise,
however, when an employee sues the insurer for denial of benefits. If
the employee sues in state court under any of the myriad possible state
causes of action, the insurer will most likely allege preemption of all
state claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA") 2 and remove the case to federal court.3 The claimant
thus faces the inconvenience of removal from his or her chosen forum
as well as the possibility that ERISA will preempt his or her state law
claims.
Once in federal court, the court determines whether removal was
proper by answering "the preliminary question: Does an ERISA welfare
benefit plan exist? ' 4 An ERISA plan exists if the employer has "established or maintained" the plan within the meaning of ERISA's def-

Copyright 1992, by LOUSINA LAW REVIEW.

1. Authorities define the term "small employer" (or its equivalent) differently in
different contexts. The Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1988), which amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988), defines "small employer" as an employer which "normally employed fewer than
20 employees on a typical business day during the preceding calendar year." Id. § 1161(b);
see infra text accompanying notes 68-70. On the other hand, the Department of Labor
defines "small private establishment" as an establishment in a "private nonagricultural
industr[y] ... with fewer than 100 workers." U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1990 Employee Benefits in Small Private Establishments iii (1991).

While a definition of "small employer" based on a more or less arbitrary number
of employees may be unavoidable, this comment ultimately relies on factors other than
the mere number of employees in resolving the question of whether ERISA should apply
to certain group health insurance plans. These factors relate to whether an employee group
health plan is insured by an insurance company or self-insured by an employer, and
whether or not the employer conducts business in a single state. See infra text accompanying
notes 174-94. It should become clear, however, that generally ERISA is less likely to
benefit, and more likely to harm, employers with few employees.
2. Codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
3.

See infra text accompanying notes 78-91.

4. Thomas v. Burlington Indus., 769 F. Supp. 368, 369 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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inition of "employee welfare benefit plan." ' Thus far, courts have failed
to formulate a satisfactory interpretation of that definition. The confusion among courts has resulted in uncertainty in the law of health
insurance' and increased litigation on the issue of what constitutes an
ERISA plan. Recently, for instance, a federal district court, noting "the
increased removal of actions to this court on the 'bare-bones' contention
that federal question jurisdiction exists as a result of ERISA preemption,"' issued a fourteen-page "standard order ... set[ting] forth the
current state of the law as to (1) the requirements for the establishment
of an ERISA welfare benefit plan; and (2) the broad preemptive scope
of ERISA and this court's resultant jurisdiction. ' ' s Undoubtedly, many
small employers, thinking they had merely purchased an insurance policy
for themselves and their employees, do not even become aware of ERISA

until litigation arises. 9

5.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). The statute provides:
(1)The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any
plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for
the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment ....
6. See, e.g., Brady v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 732 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. La.),
rev'd without opinion, 915 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1990), in which a federal district court
judge resorted to a footnote to explain that
[wihile recent cases suggest that most policies are covered by ERISA, the courts
have not yet gone so far as to declare that all insurance policies are, by definition,
a plan for ERISA purposes. Since the policy in the present instance has few
of the features required for ERISA coverage, if we were to call this a plan,
we would, in effect, be doing what courts have so far been loath to do in
declaring that all policies, regardless of their purchase, administration and other
features, are under ERISA's control. In short, if we were to call this an ERISA
plan, we would be unable to declare any policy anything other than an ERISA
plan, making state insurance law extraneous.
Id. at 680 n.l. After holding that an ERISA plan did not exist in the case before him,
the judge noted (in another footnote) the unusual difficulty of the decision and continued
as follows:
This court, however, is not playing poker and cannot pass. We must make a
decision and, after consulting the most recent jurisprudence, we are satisfied
that there are better reasons for holding this an insurance policy only, rather
than calling this an ERISA plan.
Id. at 681 n.2. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the case without
opinion.
7. Thomas, 769 F. Supp. at 371.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Clark v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 737 F. Supp. 376, 383 (W.D. La.),
aff'd, 887 F.2d 1276 (th Cir. 1989), where certain employees of a plan insurer, "though
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Because of ERISA's "powerful pre-emptive force,"' 0 the issue of
whether a particular insurance policy is an ERISA plan is of crucial
importance to claimants. State laws may provide common law or statutory remedies for recovery of damages caused by an insurer's wrongful
denial of benefits. These remedies usually derive from state tort or
contract law and often provide for compensatory damages, punitive
damages or penalties, and attorney's fees." The need for such remedies
to control insurer misconduct is particularly acute since an insurance
company's "fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its profit-making
role as a business."'" Yet, despite the insurer's inherent conflict of
interest, ERISA will preempt all state law remedies for improper claims
processing if the insurance policy is characterized as an "employee
welfare benefit plan" under ERISA. a And although the plaintiff may
amend his or her complaint to state a cause of action under ERISA, 14
ERISA provides a plan participant or beneficiary with essentially only
one cause of action: an action to recover benefits due under the terms

vested with substantial control over the administration of the [plan], had little to no
knowledge of ERISA nor the rights afforded by the Act or requirements of a fiduciary"
and "testified that they did not understand the meaning of the word 'fiduciary."' See
infra text accompanying notes 92-95 and 127-28.
10. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1557 (1987).
11. See, e.g., id. at 43-44, 107 S. Ct. at 1551 (plaintiff sought compensatory and
punitive damages for claims of tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties,
and fraud under.Mississippi common law of bad faith); Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook
Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990) (statute providing treble damages and attorney's
fees for unfair and deceptive trade practices under Texas Insurance Code was codification
of common law doctrine of negligent misrepresentation); Weiner v. Blue Cross of Md.,
730 F. Supp. 674 (D. Md. 1990) (plaintiff awarded a total of $700,000 in compensatory
damages, $6.5 million in punitive damages, and $1.4 million in attorneys' fees for claims
of fraud, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against insurance
company); Cramer v. Association Life Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 533 (La. 1990) (Louisiana
statute providing double damages and attorney's fees for failure to timely pay claim).
See also Brent Biggs. Recent Developments, Insurance-ERISA, 22 St. Mary's L.J. 1147
(1991) [hereinafter Biggs); Robert L. Aldisert, Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith:
Only Congress Can Save Us After Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 1343 (1988) [hereinafter Aldisert, Note); Keith A. Rabenberg, Note, Punitive
Damages and ERISA: An Anomalous Effect of ERISA's Preemption of Common Law
Actions, 65 Wash. U. L.Q. 589 (1987).
12. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (1 th Cir.
1990). For an example of egregious insurer misconduct, see Cataldie v. Louisiana Health
Serv. and Indem. Co., 456 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1984), where, after the plaintiff's threeyear-old daughter was diagnosed as having brain cancer, the insurer increased the premium
over 250% and the deductible 5,000% while decreasing major medical coverage by 92%.
13. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987); see
infra text accompanying notes 51-57.
14. Thomas v. Burlington Indus, 769 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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of the plan plus discretionary attorney's fees and costs." As pointed
out by Justice Doggett of the Texas Supreme Court:
[Tjhe workers ERISA was intended to protect lack a remedy
for wrongs unaddressed by the statute, while the companies
targeted by Congress employ ERISA as an effective shield against
responsibility for wrongful processing of claims .... Under ERISA, insurers who provide group benefit plans have little in6
centive to deal promptly and fairly with employee participants.'
These results are at odds with the two principal goals Congress
sought to achieve by enacting ERISA. Congress enacted ERISA to protect
workers' benefits from administrator abuse, and to encourage employers
to establish employee benefit plans." The problem with applying ERISA
to small-employer plans is that ERISA provides less protection of work-

ers' insurance benefits than state tort, contract, and insurance law remedies would provide," while at the same time ERISA offers small
employers little incentive to establish employee benefit plans.' 9 Since
ERISA neither protects the benefits of employees of small employers,
nor encourages small employers to establish benefit plans, it is unlikely
that Congress intended ERISA to apply in such cases. Thus, until
Congress amends ERISA to exclude small-employer plans expressly,
courts should consider the impact of ERISA on small-employer plans
as well as the goals of ERISA as a whole in construing ERISA's
definition of "employee welfare benefit plan."' 0
This comment concludes that where small employers purchase em-

ployee group health insurance through commercial insurers, coverage
under ERISA fails to promote either of the Act's dual goals of protecting

workers' benefits and encouraging employers to form employee benefit
plans. Part II of this comment describes these goals and provides an
overview of the pertinent features of the Act, including its provisions

15. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) and (g) (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
16. Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 80SS.W.2d 387, 392-93 (Tex. 1991)
(Doggett, J.,concurring). See also Biggs. supra note I; Aldisert, Note, supra note I1.
17. ERISA provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility. and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 25-38.
18. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text and infra text accompanying notes
152-66.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 174-76.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(!) (1988). See supra note 5.
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regarding preemption and civil enforcement. Next, through an examination of cases in which the existence of ERISA plans was at issue,
Part III traces the development of judicial interpretations of ERISA as
applied to small-employer plans. Part IV analyzes the application of
ERISA to small-employer plans in light of the goals Congress sought
to achieve by regulating employee benefit plans and in light of the
impact of ERISA's preemption and civil enforcement provisions on small
employers and their employees. Finally, the comment recommends in
Part V that courts interpret ERISA's definition of "employee welfare
benefit plan" in a manner consistent with the Act as a whole; thereby
excluding small-employer plans from ERISA coverage, or alternatively
that Congress amend ERISA to exclude small-employer plans expressly.
Although this comment is not intended to question the effectiveness
of ERISA as applied to self-insured employee welfare benefit plans, the
comment relies heavily on the distinction between "insured" and "selfinsured" plans. 2 1 An "insured" plan is one which is funded by the
purchase of insurance from a commercial insurer. The employer simply
applies to the insurance company for a group insurance policy to offer
to its employees. Often a minimum percentage of the total number of
employees must enroll, and the employer must pay a percentage of the
premiums. The employer collects the balance of the premiums through
payroll deductions and forwards the total to the insurance company.
The employer may distribute enrollment forms, claim forms, and policy
certificates to its employees, and may update the enrollment status of
employees, but the insurance company processes all claims and administers the insurance fund.
In contrast, a "self-insured" or "uninsured" employee welfare benefit plan is funded exclusively or partially by the employer's and employees' combined contributions. The employer may administer the fund
and process claims, or it may contract with an insurance company or
a professional plan administrator to provide these services. A plan is
partially funded when it purchases "stop-loss" insurance to protect its
assets in the event of catastrophic claims. Although courts have disagreed
over whether to treat partially funded plans as "insured" or "selfinsured" for purposes of ERISA preemption," these plans will be con21.

For a discussion of insured versus self-insured plans, see Daniel A. Engel, ERISA:

To Preempt or Not to Preempt, That Is A Questionl, 22 Tort & Ins. L.J. 431 (1987)
[hereinafter Engel].
22. E.g., self-insured plans which purchased stop-loss insurance were treated as self-

insured plans for purposes of ERISA preemption in Brown v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351
(5th Cir. 1990) and Moore v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.
1986). But see Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Baerwaldt, 767
F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059, 106 S.Ct. 801 (1986), where the
court treated a self-insured plan with stop-loss coverage as an insured plan. See also.
Engel, supra note 21, at 443-46 (discussing partially insured plans).
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sidered "self-insured" for purposes of this comment since at least part
of the insurance fund is controlled directly or indirectly by the employer.

Because a self-insured plan, by definition, must be "established or
maintained" by an employer, such a plan is probably always an ERISA
plan. But creating a self-insured plan requires a significant number of
employees and considerable financial and administrative resources, all
of which a small employer could be expected to lack. Consequently,
most small employers are unable to establish self-insured plans; instead,

they must purchase insurance in order to provide benefits for their
employees. 23 Furthermore, while there is little doubt that ERISA's comprehensive regulation of self-insured plans has substantially achieved the

goals Congress intended,

4

the differences are great between self-insured

and insured plans. It follows that effective regulation of self-insured
plans does not preclude the possibility that ERISA fails when applied
to insured plans, at least when those plans are purchased by small
employers.
II.

PURPOSE AND PROVISIONS OF ERISA

Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 in response to public outcry for
reform of laws regulating employee benefit plans.2 5 ERISA regulates two
types of employee benefit plans: pension plans and employee welfare
benefit plans. Although this comment is concerned only with ERISA as
applied to certain employee group health insurance plans, an understanding of the problems ERISA was designed to address is necessary
to appreciate that small employers and their employees are not faced
with the same problems and that, consequently, application of ERISA

to small-employer plans is not justified and actually defeats Congress's
goals of protecting small employers and their employees.

23. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health
Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 255, 295-96 (1990). According to
Bobinski:
Larger firms are better able to self-insure for several reasons. First, a relatively
large number of employees is necessary to spread the risk of a large payout.
Second, economies of scale in plan development and implementation are only
reached with relatively large numbers of employees. Finally, companies that selfinsure must be prepared to face possibly complicated benefits administration
and larger fluctuations in cash flow.
Id. at 296 n.133, citing Jenson & Gabel, The Erosion of Purchased Health Insurance,
.25 Inquiry 328, 330 (1988).
24. See generally David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A
Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 427 (1987).
25. See generally Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted? The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: The First Decade, in Information
Paper of the U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, S. Print No. 221, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (Sen. Print 1984) [hereinafter Gordon]. See also Thomas W. Jennings, Introduction,
in ERISA: A Comprehensive Guide I (Wald & Kenty eds. 1991) (hereinafter Jennings].
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Purpose of ERISA

Before 1974 workers were often subject to severe pension plan vesting
provisions as well as the possibility of premature plan termination resulting in loss of accrued benefits.26 The closing of the Studebaker
Automobile Company in 1963, for instance, left 4,400 workers without
pensions or with reduced pensions even though the pension plan had
been well funded and the workers' pension rights were vested.17 Plan
funds were also subject to misuse by plan administrators as revealed by
:
House and Senate committee investigations in the 1950's and 1960S.28
Further, employers with employees in more than one state encountered
multiple and conflicting state regulations which presented obstacles to
efficient administration of benefit plans.29 In short, the need to protect
workers from pension plan abuses and to protect employers from multiple
and conflicting state regulations prompted Congress to enact ERISA.
ERISA addressed the need to protect workers by establishing fair
vesting standards 0 and strict funding requirements.' To protect against
loss of vested benefits in the event of plan termination, the Act established a termination insurance program.32 The Act also established stringent reporting and disclosure guidelines," imposed fiduciary obligations
on plan administrators, 4 and, in order to enforce compliance, created
causes of action on behalf of plan participants and the Secretary of
Labor.3 5
ERISA addressed the need to protect employers from multiple and
conflicting state regulations by preempting all state laws which "relate
to" employee benefit plans.3 6 By assuring uniform regulation of employee
benefit plans, the Act's broad preemption provision was designed to

26. Gordon, supra note 25, at 2-10. See also Jennings. supra note 25, at 2-6.
27. Gordon, supra note 25, at 8. See also, Jennings, supra note 25, at 4-5.
28. Gordon, supra note 25, at 6-10. See also Jennings, supra note 25, at 5-6.
29. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2216
(1987), where the court described the problem of inconsistent and conflicting state regulations as follows:
A plan would be required to keep certain records in some states but not in
others; to make certain benefits available in some states but not in others; to
process claims in a certain way in some states but not in others; and to comply
with certain fiduciary standards in some states but not in others.
See also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, IIl S. Ct. 403, 408 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
463 U.S. 85, 95-100, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2899-2901 (1983).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (1988).
31.
32.

Id. §§ 1081-86.
Id. 44 1301-1405.

33.

Id.

34.
35.
36.

Id. §§ 1101-14.
Id. §§ 1131-41.
Id. § 1144(a).

§§ 1021-31.
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facilitate the administration of plans covering employees in more than
one state in order to encourage employers to establish employee benefit
plans and to enable them to maintain benefit levels."
Thus, ERISA's vesting standards, funding requirements, termination
insurance, reporting and disclosure guidelines, and fiduciary obligations
are aimed primarily at self-insured pension and welfare benefit plans3"
and have limited utility as applied to employee group health insurance
policies purchased from commercial insurers. Moreover, because small
employers typically do business in only one state, they have little need
to be protected from multiple and conflicting state regulations.
B. Preemption
The issue of ERISA preemption arises only after a court concludes
that an employee welfare benefit plan exists within the meaning of
ERISA.3 9 Where an employer has not established or maintained such a
plan, state law governs.
A comprehensive analysis of ERISA preemption is beyond the scope
of this comment. On the other hand, ERISA preemption may directly
affect the rights and remedies of claimants who sue for recovery of
benefits under insurance policies purchased by their employers. Accordingly, this discussion will be limited to an analysis of the effects of
ERISA preemption on employees' claims for benefits under group health
insurance policies purchased by small employers.
ERISA's preemption clause states that "the provisions of [ERISA]
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .

. . ."4

However, the

preemption clause is modified by a savings clause which provides that
37. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-11, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 221617 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 95-100, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2899-2901
(1983).
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988), Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy,
which states:
The Congress finds ... that despite the enormous growth in (employee benefit]
plans many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated
retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that.
owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and
stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may
be endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds
have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived
of anticipated benefits ....
Id. § 1001(a) (emphasis added).
39. See Thomas v. Burlington Indus., 769 F. Supp. 368, 369 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-98,
103 S.Ct. 2980, 2899-2901 ("A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan," id. at 9697, 103 S. Ct. at 2900, and ERISA's "pre-emptive scope [is) as broad as its language,"
id. at 98, 103 S. Ct. at 2901).
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"nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance ....
ERISA's preemption scheme is further complicated by the deemer clause,
which provides:
Neither an employee benefit plan ... nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer ... or to be engaged in the business
of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts ....4
To summarize, if a state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan,
it is preempted. But if the law "regulates insurance," it is saved from
preemption by the savings clause. Finally, under the deemer clause, even
a state law which "regulates insurance" is preempted if it attempts to
regulate an employee benefit plan. In short, the only state laws which
are not preempted are those which regulate insurance and which are
applied solely to insurance companies or insurance contracts as opposed
to employee benefit plans.
The extent of ERISA preemption in any particular case depends on
the distinction between self-insured and insured plans. Since self-insured
plans are funded by employers rather than insurance companies, state
laws which regulate insurance are preempted and do not regulate selfinsured plans. In contrast, the same state laws regulate insured plans
because those laws are saved from preemption by the savings clause
when applied to insurance companies.
The Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Massachusetts 3 made it clear that the distinction between insured and
self-insured employee welfare benefit plans is critical in determining
whether state laws will be preempted. In that case, a Massachusetts
statute required health insurance policies to provide certain minimum
mental health care benefits. In holding that the law was not preempted
when applied to group health insurance policies issued by insurers of
ERISA plans, the Court stated:
We are aware that our decision results in a distinction between
insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect
regulation while the latter are not. By so doing we merely give
life to a distinction created by Congress in the "deemer clause,"
a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has chosen not
to alter."

41.
42.
43.
44.

29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (1988).
Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
Id. at 747, 105 S. Ct. at 2393.
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The Court also noted that its interpretation of ERISA's preemption
provisions was consistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides that "[t]he business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation or taxation of such business."'
It seems clear that while Congress has refused to permit states to
"deem" self-insured ERISA plans to be insurance companies for purposes of state laws regulating insurance, it has at the same time acknowledged the desirability of state regulation of insurance contracts
and insurance companies." Accordingly, it might also seem that ERISA
preemption would have little or no effect on employees' claims for
benefits under group health insurance policies purchased by their employers. However, at least two types of state laws remain preempted by
ERISA whether those laws are applied to self-insured or insured plans.
State laws which are preempted when applied to insured plans include
those which do not "regulate insurance" within the meaning of the
savings clause, and those which provide state remedies for improper
processing of claims for benefits.
In determining whether a state law regulates insurance within the
meaning of the savings clause, courts have sought guidance from federal
jurisprudence interpreting the phrase "business of insurance" as used
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act."7 According to that jurisprudence, a law
regulates the "business of insurance" if it (1) has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk, (2) regulates an integral part
of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured, and (3)
is limited to regulation of entities within the insurance industry. 8 In
Metropolitan, the Massachusetts mandated-benefit law met all three criteria because it effected the sharing of the risk of mental health care,
limited the type of insurance an insurer could sell to policyholders, and
imposed requirements only on insurers. 49 Hence, the law regulated the
"business of insurance" and therefore was saved from preemption. 0

45. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1988).
46. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, III S. Ct. 403 (1990), where the Court stated:
By recognizing a distinction between insurers of plans and the contracts of those
insurers, which are subject to direct state regulation, and self-insured employee
benefit plans governed by ERISA, which are not, we observe Congress' presumed
desire to reserve to the States the regulation of the "business of insurance."
Id. at 410.
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ loll et seq. (1988). See supra text accompanying note 45.
48. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743, 105 S. Ct. 2380,
2391 (1985), citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129, 102 S.Ct.
3002, 3009 (1982) and Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,

99 S. Ct. 1067 (1979).
49. Id. at 743. 105 S. Ct. at 2391.
50. Id., 105 S.Ct. at 2391.
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In Pilot Life InsuranceCo. v. Dedeaux, s 1the Supreme Court applied
the same factors to a claim of bad faith under Mississippi common law
for an insurer's failure to pay insurance benefits. The common law of
bad faith did not affect the transferring or spreading of a policyholder's
risk, did not define the relationship between the insurer and the insured,
and developed from general principles of tort and contract law available
in any Mississippi breach of contract case. 2 Since the law met none of
the McCarran-Ferguson criteria, it did not regulate the "business of
insurance" and therefore was preempted.' 3 "A common-sense view of
the word 'regulates,"' said the Court, "would lead to the conclusion
that in order to regulate insurance, a law must not just have an impact
on the insurance
industry, but must be specifically directed toward that
4
industry."'

Perhaps more significantly, the Pilot Life Court held that in actions
by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of claims for benefits, ERISA's civil enforcement remedies are
exclusive." "[Tihe federal scheme would be completely undermined if
ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies
under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA."' 6 In other words,
even if a state law regulates insurance, ERISA preempts the law anyway
if it provides a cause of action and remedy for improper processing of
claims.5 .
In Cramer v. Association Life Insurance Co.,18 the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted Metropolitan and Pilot Life to create a distinction between state laws which regulate the substantive terms of
insurance contracts, and laws which merely regulate aspects of transacting
the business of group insurance.' 9 Since ERISA does not regulate the
substantive content of welfare benefit plans, the court reasoned, state
laws which regulate the substantive terms of insurance contracts are not
preempted. 6° Such laws include, in addition to mandated-benefit laws
51. 481 U.S. 41, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (1987).
52. Id.at 50-51, 107 S.Ct. at 1554-55.
53. Id.at 51, 107 S.Ct. at 1555.
54. Id. at 50, 107 S. Ct. at 1554.
55. Id. at 52, 107 S. Ct. at 1555.
56. Id. at 54, 107 S. Ct. at 1556.
57. Id., 107 S. Ct. at 1556. See also Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 901
F.2d 446, 452 n.21 (5th Cir. 1990):
Under such an interpretation, the role of the savings clause would be limited
to sparing from preemption substantive insurance laws that could be enforced
through some vehicle other than a private cause of action, such as an administrative or judicial enforcement action for declaratory or injunctive relief brought
by the state's insurance regulatory authority.
58. 569 So. 2d 533 (La. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1391 (1991).
59. Id.at 541.
60. Id.
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like the one in Metropolitan, those which regulate grace periods, conversion privileges, and cancellation of benefits.6 On the other hand,
ERISA's comprehensive civil enforcement scheme regulates the practice
of claims handling, so laws which regulate aspects of transacting the
business of insurance are preempted. 62 Such laws include those which
provide tort or contract remedies for bad faith or breach of contract,
like the one in Pilot Life, as well as those which provide remedies for
unfair insurance practices, unfair trade practices, and negligent misrepresentation. 61
The Cramer analysis reveals two idiosyncracies of ERISA preemption. First, the fact that ERISA does not regulate the substantive content
of welfare benefit plans fails to explain why states are permitted to
regulate the content of insured plans but are not permitted, because of
the deemer clause, to regulate the content of self-insured plans. The
Metropolitan Court simply concluded that "[s]uch disuniformities ...
are the inevitable result of the congressional decision to 'save' local
insurance regulation." But the distinction serves to reinforce the notion
that the two types of plans are quite different and therefore require
different treatment.
Second, in view of the recognition of the need for different treatment
of insured and self-insured plans, it seems inconsistent to require both
types of plans to be treated the same with regard to laws which regulate
aspects of transacting the business of insurance. Concededly, as the Pilot
Life Court pointed out, ERISA's comprehensive civil enforcement scheme
"represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims
settlement procedures against public interest in encouraging the formation
of employee benefit plans."6' 5 As will be recalled, however, ERISA's
goal of encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans was to be
achieved through uniform regulation of such plans. 66 But while uniformity facilitates the administration of large self-insured plans, it has
limited utility for insured intrastate plans, especially since those plans
are nonetheless subject to state regulation of insurance contracts. 6 Moreover, since small employers lack this counterbalancing need for uniformity, wholesale preemption of state causes of action and remedies for

61. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 728 fn. 2, 105
S. Ct. 2380, 2383 n.2 (1985); Cramer, 569 So. 2d at 541.
62. Cramer, 569 So. 2d at 541.
63. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51-52, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1555
(1987). See also Biggs, supra note 11.
64. Metropolitan, 471 U.S. at 747, 105 S. Ct. at 2393.
65. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54, 107 S. Ct. at 1556. See supra text accompanying
notes 55.57.
66. See supra text accompanying note 37.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
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improper processing of claims needlessly frustrates ERISA's goal of
protecting employees from abuses by plan administrators.
It should be pointed out that the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA") amended ERISA by requiring
employers who participate in group health plans to continue to provide
health coverage to employees who leave work under certain statutorily
prescribed circumstances.6 COBRA thus represents the first attempt of
ERISA to regulate the substantive terms of employee welfare benefit.
69
plans. Because ERISA's civil enforcement remedies are exclusive, it
seems likely that COBRA will preempt conflicting state laws even though
such laws regulate the substantive terms of insurance contracts and even
when those laws are applied to insured plans.
However, COBRA includes an important provision which states that
COBRA "shall not apply to any group health plan for any calendar
year if all employers maintaining such plan normally employed fewer
than 20 employees on a typical business day during the preceding calendar
year."7 0 In other words, employers with fewer than 20 employees are
exempt from coverage under COBRA. Thus, COBRA preemption may
be of no consequence to many small employers or their employees. But
COBRA's small-employer exemption is strong evidence of Congress's
awareness that uniform regulations serve little purpose with regard to
small-employer plans.
In sum, employees asserting claims for benefits under insurance
policies purchased by small employers find that neither ERISA nor
COBRA preempt their claims for enforcement of state laws which regulate the substantive terms of group health insurance policies. However,
employees' claims for remedies under state laws regulating aspects of
transacting the business of insurance are preempted. As a result, ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions contain the sole remedies for employees
asserting causes of action for improper processing of claims for benefits.
C. Civil Enforcement
ERISA provides that a "participant or beneficiary"" of an employee
benefit plan may bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of
the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan ...

6§.
69.

."" A participant or beneficiary may also bring actions

29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1988).
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1555 (1987).

70. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
71.
72.

Id. § 1132(a)(1).
Id. § 1t32(a)(1)(B).
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to obtain a statement of benefits,'" to recover statutory penalties for
failure of a plan administrator to comply with a request for a statement
of benefits, 4 and for injunctive or other equitable relief to enforce
ERISA rights." In any of these actions, the court may also award
attorney's fees and costs. ' 6
Under ERISA, then, an employee who believes simply that he or
she has been wrongfully denied benefits essentially has only one cause
of action: an action to recover benefits due under the terms of the
plan, with a chance of recovering attorney's fees and costs. Despite the
fact that an insurer's wrongful refusal to pay medical expenses may
itself be as financially debilitating as an illness, ERISA permits no remedy
for the resulting damages."
Furthermore, litigation under ERISA is likely to be lengthy and
expensive. ERISA authorizes state and federal courts to have concurrent
jurisdiction over individual claims for benefits,'7 which means that the
plaintiff has the option to file the action in state court. The defendant,
however, then has an absolute right to remove the claim to federal
court,' 9 subject only to compliance with the general procedural requirements of the federal removal statute. s0 This is true notwithstanding the
well-pleaded complaint rule enunciated in Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co. v. Mottley, s' whereby a cause of action arises under federal law
only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal
law. Under ERISA, even if the plaintiff's complaint raises only state
law causes of action, the defendant can assert an ERISA preemption

73. Id. § 1132(a)(4).
74. Id. § 1132(a)(l)(A).
75. Id. § 1132(a)(2).
76. Id. § 1132(g)(1).
77. See, e.g., Weiner v. Blue Cross of Md., 730 F. Supp. 674 (D. Md. 1990), where
the plaintiff incurred medical expenses as a result of tragedies suffered by two of his
sons. One son was diagnosed with AIDS and later died, and the other was rendered a
quadriplegic in an automobile accident. Although the insurer eventually paid all contractual
obligations under the policy, it had discontinued payments for eight months and had
resumed payments only after .the plaintiff filed suit to compel their continuation. The
plaintiff then filed another suit in state court for state common law claims of fraud,
negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Fortunately for the plaintiff,
the defendant insurer failed to remove the case or to raise the defense of ERISA preemption, and a jury awarded a total of $700,000 in compensatory damages and $6.5
million in punitive damages, as well as $1.4 million in attorneys' fees. In contrast, had
the case been governed by ERISA, ERISA preemption would have left the plaintiff without
a remedy.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
79. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (1987).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
81. 211 U.S. 149, 29 S. Ct. 42 (1908).
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defense and thereby "convert[] the; related claim into a federal question '" '
for purposes of removal. The rationale for this exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule is that "Congress may so completely pre-empt
a particular area that any civil complaint8 3raising this select group of
claims is necessarily federal in character."
The plaintiff may challenge removal jurisdiction only after the defendant has removed the action to federal court.8 The defendant then
has the burden of establishing the propriety of removal"3 by showing
that three requirements have been met: first, that the health insurance
coverage is part of an ERISA plan;8 6 second, that plaintiff's cause of
action falls within the "sweep" of the preemption clause and is not
excepted from preemption by the savings clause; 87 and third, that the
cause of action states a claim for which Congress provided an "exclusive
federal cause of action for resolution of such disputes." 8 Under the
law as it now stands, meeting the first requirement is fairly easy in
most cases, as will be shown in Part III of this comment. Also, as
shown in the above discussion of ERISA preemption, the second and
third requirements are easily met in most cases because ERISA preempts
all state actions providing remedies for improper processing of claims,89
and ERISA's civil enforcement provisions provide the sole cause of
action for asserting a claim for benefits due under an ERISA plan.90
Once the defendant establishes that the plaintiff's state cause of action
is preempted, the cause of action may be recharacterized to state a claim
arising under ERISA. 9"
One may wonder why a plaintiff, by filing an action in state court,
would risk the inconvenience of removal to federal court. Perhaps the
question is whether such a plaintiff is even aware that he or she is
suing for benefits under an ERISA plan rather than under a simple
group health insurance policy. Such lack of notice is not improbable,

82. Belasco v. W.K.P. Wilson & Sons, Inc., 833 F.2d 277, 282 (Ilth Cir. 1987),
citing Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66-67, 107 S. Ct. at 1548.
83. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63-64, 107 S.Ct. at 1546.
84. See Thomas v. Burlington Indus., 769 F. Supp. 368, 369 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Davis
v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Kan. 1990); Dodd v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 564, 566 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
85. Davis, 746 F. Supp. at 46.
86. Thomas, 769 F. Supp. at 369.
87. Davis, 746 F. Supp. at 47.
88. Id., quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62, 107 S.Ct.
1542, 1546 (1987).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
-90. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
91. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 64-66, 107 S. Ct. at 1546-48; Thomas v. Burlington Indus.,
769 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Davis v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp.
44, 48-49 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
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for although ERISA imposes certain disclosure, reporting, and filing
requirements on plan administrators, 92 these requirements are not prerequisites to coverage under ERISA and do not arise until it is determined
that ERISA covers a plan. 93 It is therefore not surprising that in one
case,9 4 certain employees of a plan insurer, "though vested with substantial control over the administration of the [plan], had little to no
knowledge of ERISA nor the rights afforded by ihe Act or requirements
of a fiduciary .

..

" and "testified that they did not understand the

meaning of the word 'fiduciary.' 95
To summarize, ERISA's civil enforcement scheme provides a plan
participant or beneficiary with a cause of action to recover benefits due
under an employee benefit plan, and this cause of action is exclusive
because ERISA preempts all state law causes of action for improper
processing of claims. In addition, since the issue of whether an ERISA
plan exists often does not arise until after the plaintiff has filed an
action in state court, those claims are subject to almost certain removal
to federal court.
As noted previously, Congress crafted ERISA's exclusive civil enforcement scheme in the interest of encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans through uniform regulation of such plans. 96 Again,
however, most small employers have little need for uniformity, and can,
in some cases, be hurt by the exclusive enforcement scheme. Furthermore,
the fact that such employers are often unaware they have established
ERISA plans seriously undermines the notion that ERISA encourages
the formation of such plans. Finally, whatever scant need for uniformity
may exist in such cases is outweighed by the need of employees to have
available the wide array of state causes of action that an individual
purchaser of the exact same policy would have at his disposal. 9'

ERISA
For reasons already suggested and to be discussed more fully in
Part IV, this comment takes the position that ERISA should not apply
III.

JURISPRUDENCE INTERPRETINO

92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1027 (1988).
93. Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 241 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1990); Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (Ilth Cir. 1982). See also
Holcomb v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 754 F. Supp. 524, 529 (N.D. Miss. 1991) (defendants
not estopped from asserting ERISA preemption as a defense because of their alleged
noncompliance with the Act). But see National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 602 F. Supp.
232, 236 (N.D. I1. 1985), rev'd, 784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986) (noncompliance as evidence
that ERISA plan was not established).
94. Clark v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 737 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 887 F.2d
1276 (5th Cir. 1989). See infra text accompanying notes 127-28.
95. Id. at 383. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37 and 65-67.
97. See Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1991) (Doggett,
J., concurring), cited in Biggs, supra note HI.
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to employee group health insurance policies purchased by small employers. This position finds support in Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health
Benefits Administration,9 where the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit stated: "Considering the history, structure and purposes
of ERISA, we cannot believe that that Act regulates bare purchases of
health insurance where ... the purchasing employer neither directly nor
indirectly owns, controls, administers or assumes responsibility for the
policy or its benefits."99
Taggart involved a corporation which subscribed to Security Multiple
Employers Trust ("SMET")' ® in order to provide health insurance for
the corporation's owner and sole employee, Stanley M. Kansas, and his
family. SMET provided a service for employers too small to qualify
for group rates on their own, such as the Taggart Corporation. Employers subscribed to SMET and became members of a "group" of
subscribers. SMET then pooled the "group's" premiums and purchased
group insurance on their behalf, thereby enabling the subscribers to
qualify for group rates. When Kansas claimed benefits for his wife,
SMET informed him that the insurer was denying coverage because of
alleged misrepresentation in his insurance application. Kansas brought
suit in federal court under ERISA, alleging that SMET was an ERISA
plan.
The court quickly dismissed the claim on the grounds that SMET
was established and operated by independent businessmen for personal
profit and that neither the Taggart Corporation nor any other employer
or employee organization participated in SMET's day-to-day operation
or administration.' 0' Therefore, SMET was "neither established nor
maintained by a 'statutory employer' or 'employee organization' ...",s02
within the meaning of ERISA's definition of "employee welfare benefit
plan." 0
More importantly, the court rejected the Secretary of Labor's contention in its amicus brief that the Taggart Corporation had established
an ERISA plan by merely subscribing to SMET. The court first noted
that "ERISA's legislative history demonstrates that its drafters were
principally concerned with abuses occurring in respect of private pension

98. 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980) (Hill, J.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S. Ct.
1739 (1981).

99. Id. at 1211.
100. For dicussion of multiple employer trusts ("MET's")and related ERISA issues,
see generally Linda L. Lanam, Public Regulation of Self-Insured and Uninsured Em.
ployment Benefit Plans-Who Is To Be Protected? A State Regulator's Perspective, 19
Forum 309 (1984).
101. Taggart, 617 F.2d at 1210.
102. Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l) (1988). See supra note 5.
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assets."' 0 4 The court then distinguished the Taggart Corporation's group
health insurance policy from other employee benefit plans:
The supposed Taggart "plan" has no assets and is liable
for no benefits. There is nothing to be placed in trust, so there
is no. trust. The corporation did no more than make payments
to a purveyor of insurance, patently for tax reasons .... There
simply exist no assets for ERISA's statutory safeguards to protect. Nor do the statute's vesting and funding goals militate in
favor of finding a "plan" here, since those provisions expressly
except "welfare" plans from their coverage .... On the other
hand, Congress has elsewhere clearly distinguished between
"health plans" and "health insurance." I.R.C. §§ 105(a),
105(e).... That Congress has thus chosen to treat the two
separately reinforces our conclusion that ERISA "plans" are
broader in concept than pure insurance transactions of the sort
involved here. 05
The court nowhere limited its holding to cases involving an employer
with a sole employee, although in effect later courts would do so. 0
Nor, as would later courts, " 7 did the Taggart court strictly construe the
statutory language which provides that an ERISA plan may be "established or maintained ...through the purchase of insurance or otherwise
....,,108
Rather, the court considered "the history, structure and purposes of ERISA . . ."9 in order to discern the intent of the drafters.
The court concluded that the drafters were primarily concerned with
protecting plan assets. ERISA's purpose, therefore, was "[tlo forestall
misappropriation and misuse of such funds. . .. "110
Significantly, the Taggart court seemed to be striving toward a
distinction between self-insured and insured employee group health plans.
It recognized early that whereas Congress has good reason to regulate
self-insured plans, that reason does not apply in the case of insured

104. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S.Ct. 1739 (1981).
105. Id.(citations omitted).
106. See, e.g., Kidder v. H & B Marine, Inc., 932 F.2d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 1991);
Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 1990);
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1375 (lth Cir. 1982); Foxworth v. Durham Life
Ins. Co., 745 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (S.D. Miss. 1990); Davis v. Time Ins. Co., 698 F.
Supp. 1317, 1321 (S.D. Miss. 1988); Perkins v. Time Ins. Co., 701 F. Supp. 576, 57778 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
107. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp., 904 F.2d at 240 and 243 n.9; Donovan, 688 F.2d at
1371.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(I) (1988).
109. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S. Ct. 1739 (1981).
110. Id.
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plans. An insured plan, suggests Taggart, should not be covered by
ERISA because "Itihere simply exist no assets for ERISA's statutory
safeguards to protect.""' Thus, the Taggart Corporation's "bare purchase[] of health insurance"" 2 did not qualify for coverage under ERISA.
In Donovan v. Dillingham," 3 the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
holding and reasoning of the former Fifth Circuit"" in Taggart that
SMET was not an employee welfare benefit plan. The court also agreed
with the holding that the Taggart Corporation itself had not established
an ERISA plan, quoting the Taggart district court's finding that 'the
subscription agreement by Stanley M. Kansas. ... simply involveld] the
purchase of insurance by plaintiff, Stanley M. Kansas, for himself and
his family.""' " But the court found that the reasoning of the Taggart
opinion
encourages too broad an interpretation.... If Taggart implies
that an employer or employee organization that only purchases
a group health insurance policy or subscribes to a MET to
provide health insurance to its employees or members cannot
be said to have established or maintained an employee welfare
benefit plan, we disagree. To that extent Taggart shall no longer
6
be binding in the Eleventh Circuit.1
The issue in Donovan was whether subscribers to a multiple employer
trust ("MET") had established employee welfare benefit plans, thereby
giving rise to fiduciary duties on the part of the trustees of the MET.
The trustees, relying on Taggart, argued that ERISA did not apply
because the subscribers had merely purchased group health insurance.
The court first construed ERISA's definition of "employee welfare
benefit plan" to require (1) a plan, fund, or program. (2) established
or maintained (3) by an employer or employee organization or both (4)
for the purpose of providing health care or other benefits (5) to participants or their beneficiaries. '7 The court then enunciated a test for

Ill. Id.
112. Id.

113. 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (Godbold, C.J.) (en banc).
114. On October 1,1981, the Fifth Circuit was divided to create the new Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits. Since the Eleventh Circuit had adopted as precedent the decisions of
the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1. 1981, see id. at 1370 n.3, Taggart
was binding on the Eleventh Circuit until Donovan overruled Taggart in part. Id. at 1375;
see infra text accompanying note 116.
115. Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1375, quoting Taggert (sic) Corp. v. Efros, 475 F. Supp.
124, 127 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd sub nom. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits
Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S. Ct. 1739

(1981).
116. Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1375.
117. Id.at 1371.
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determining whether a "plan, fund, or program" had been "established
or maintained" by an employer: "whether from the surrounding circumstances a reasonable person could ascertain the intended benefits,
beneficiaries, source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits." ' 8 Finally, the court applied the test to the MET subscribers and
held that the employers or unions had established employee welfare
benefit plans by furnishing health insurance to their employees or members.
Unlike the Taggart court, the Donovan court seemed to attach no
significance to the distinction between insured and self-insured plans.
Rather, it characterized the purchase of insurance as "only a method
of implementing a plan, fund, or program and [as] evidence of the
existence of a plan but ...not itself a plan." 11 9 Whereas the Taggart
court stressed the fact that Congress clearly distinguished between "health
plans" and "health insurance," 120 the Donovan court, by means of strict
statutory construction, blurred that distinction. In so doing, it disreso caregarded "the history, structure and purposes of ERISA .".'
fully considered in Taggart.
A federal district court applied the Donovan reasoning in Davis v.
Time Insurance Co.'2 In that case, T.E. Cook Construction Company
("Cook") subscribed to a MET for the purpose of providing group
insurance for its five employees and their dependents. When the wife
of an employee was denied benefits by the insurer, she filed suit in
state court alleging bad faith under Mississippi law. The defendant
removed the action to federal district court and alleged preemption under
ERISA.
After quickly concluding that Cook's subscription satisfied "all the
statutory and precedential requirements for compliance under ERISA' ' 23
as spelled out in Donovan, the court nevertheless took pains to distinguish Taggart. Predictably, it contrasted the Taggart Corporation's single
employee with Cook's five employees. It also made much of the fact
that the Taggart Corporation made payments to SMET, whereas Cook
made payments directly to the insurance company. In addition, the court
noted that in Taggart, SMET chose the insurance company, the policy,
and the coverages, whereas in the case before it Cook himself made
those decisions. Finally, the court pointed out that, unlike the Taggart
Corporation, Cook executed an Employer Participation Agreement which

118. Id.at 1373.
119. Id.at 1375.

120. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin, 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S. Ct. 1739 (1981).
121. Id.
122. 698 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
123. Id. at 1320.
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"provided that the employees had an interest in the subject policy and
that the employer assumed control and responsibility for administration
[of] ...the group policy and its benefits as they related to the employer
unit."' 4
In its assertion that "the Fifth Circuit limited its holding [in Taggart]
to those situations in which 'the purchasing employer neither directly
or [sic] indirectly owns, controls, administers or assumes responsibility
for the policy or its benefits," ' 5 the Davis court implied that the
circumstances surrounding Cook's subscription to the MET warranted
a finding that Cook actually owned, controlled, administered, and assumed responsibility for the insurance policy and its benefits. If this is
the Davis court's interpretation of the quoted language, it is unpersuasive.
In view of Taggart's emphasis on ERISA's goal of safeguarding plan
assets, a more meaningful interpretation would require an employer to
own all or part of the insurance funds and be an administrator, manager,
or trustee of those funds; to make decisions concerning how the plan
assets are invested and whether or not to grant claims; and to be subject
to suit by employees whose claims are denied. 2 6 In other words, a more
persuasive interpretation of the Taggart language would require an ERISA plan to be self-insured.
A federal district court followed Taggart in Clark v. Golden Rule
Insurance Co.,121 a case factually on all fours with Davis. Clark Custom
Guns, Inc. ("Clark") purchased a group health insurance policy from
the defendant insurer through a MET. Clark contributed fifty percent
of the monthly premiums for the plaintiff and four other employees,
forwarding the total premium directly to the insurer. Whereas the Davis
court relied on identical facts to distinguish Cook's activities from those
of the Taggart Corporation, the Clark court held that Clark neither
established nor maintained an employee welfare benefit plan. The court
reasoned:
There simply is no substantive distinction between the level
of participation by Taggart Corp. and that of Clark Custom
Guns, Inc. Plaintiff, as the owner of the entity, merely purchased
insurance that was sold to him by an independent agent. Claims
were submitted to and processed through Golden Rule. The only
assets contributed were premiums paid by plaintiff's business.

124. Id.at 1321.
125. Id.at 1320.
126. See Brady v.Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 732 F. Supp. 678, 680 (W.D. La.),
rev'd without opinion, 915 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1990), discussed supra note 6. See also
National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 602 F. Supp. 232, 236-37 (N.D. Ill.
1985), rev'd, 784
F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986).
127. 737 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. La.), aff'd on other grounds, 887 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir.
1989).
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There is no evidentiary basis permitting this court to conclude
that Clark Custom Guns, Inc. directly or indirectly owned,
controlled, administered or assumed responsibility for the policy
or its benefits ....

Because the facts in this case are virtually

indistinguishable from those in Taggart, the holding in Donovan
...

does not require a different result.'

Clearly, the Davis and Clark courts had two very different ideas
about what constitutes an ERISA plan. The Davis court adopted Donovan's reasoning and found that Cook's purchase of insurance for the
benefit of its employees amounted to establishment of an employee
welfare benefit plan. On the other hand, the Clark court, after citing
Taggart extensively and recognizing Donovan, found that the same activities on the part of Clark amounted to a mere purchase of insurance.
Again, considering ERISA's policies of protecting plan assets and worker
well-being, the Taggart reasoning makes more sense as applied to the
facts in Davis and Clark.
Notwithstanding the strength of its reasoning, Taggart appeared
doomed when the Fifth Circuit seemed to adopt the Donovan test
unreservedly in Memorial Hospital System v. Northbrook Life Insurance
Co. 2 9 The relevant facts were again almost identical to the earlier cases.
The employer, Noffs, Inc. ("Noffs"), purchased a group health insurance
policy from an insurer through a MET. Noffs contributed half the
monthly premiums for its employees and forwarded the total premium
directly to the insurer. The court applied the Donovan test to these
facts and held that because "a reasonable person could ascertain the
intended benefits under Noffs' plan, a class of plan beneficiaries, the
source of financing for the plan, and procedures for receiving benefits,"'' 0 the policy in question was in fact an ERISA plan.
In countering the plaintiff's argument that Noffs had merely purchased an insurance policy, the court focused on Noffs' intent to provide
benefits to its employees, and on the existence of an "employer-employeeplan relationship."'' The court explained:
Although we held in Taggart that the purchase of an insurance policy does not, in and of itself, establish the existence
of an ERISA plan, we certainly did not hold, contrary to
Memorial's argument, that an employer's purchase of health
insurance offers no evidence of an intent to provide such a
plan ....

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 382-83 (citations omitted).
904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990) (King, J.).
Id. at 243.
Id.
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Unlike Taggart, the present case does not involve the bare
purchase of insurance by a lone employee through a MET. Noffs,
a statutory employer, has chosen to provide welfare benefits to
all of its full-time employees through the purchase of a group
insurance policy. Noffs is solely responsible under the policy for
submitting monthly premiums directly to Northbrook by the
premium due dates. The fact that Noffs' administrative functions
under the policy are minimal is perfectly in keeping with its
intent that Northbrook administer the plan as well as insure it.
There is, thus, an employer-employee-plan relationship that was
lacking in Taggart.3 '
Thus, following the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Donovan, the
Fifth Circuit abandoned its earlier position that the drafters of ERISA
did not intend the Act to regulate a plan without any "assets for ERISA's
statutory safeguards to protect.""' After admitting that "one of the
principal goals of ERISA is the protection of plan assets held in trust
for the benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries," ' 4 the court simply
cited the statute's language in which "ERISA specifically envisions that
an employer may establish an employee welfare benefit plan 'through
the purchase of insurance or otherwise."" 3 But the court failed to
explain how strict construction of the statute and rejection of the rationale it had adopted in Taggart would promote the goals of ERISA.
Less than a year after Taggart appeared to be laid to rest, however,
the Fifth Circuit resurrected it in Kidder v. H&B Marine, Inc.,"16 where
the court, in a per curiam opinion, retreated somewhat from its extreme
position in Memorial Hospital. Once again, the facts involved an employer, H&B Construction ("H&B"), which purchased a group health
insurance policy for its employees and paid a percentage of the premiums.
H&B argued that under Taggart its bare purchase of insurance did not
establish an ERISA plan, and that "some degree of active involvement
... [was] necessary to establish an ERISA plan.'" Based on Donovan
and Memorial Hospital, the court rejected H&B's argument, concluding
that H&B's "payment of premiums on behalf of its employees is 'sub13
stantial evidence that a plan, fund, or program [was] established."' '

132. Id. at 242 (citations omitted).
133. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S. Ct. 1739 (1981).
134. Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbr0ok Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 243 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1990).
135. Id., quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
136. 932 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1991) (Thornberry, J.)(per curiam).
137.
138.

Id. at 352.
Id. at 353, quoting Donovan v.Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
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Significantly, however, the court displayed a lack of conviction in
its own reasoning when it admitted that H&B's "argument has force
and, had there been no other relevant precedents, might have persuaded
us to reverse the district court's judgment or at. least to remand the
case for redetermination.' ' 3 9 The court seemed anxious to make it clear
that neither Taggart nor Clark had been overruled, for while it affirmed
the district court's holding, it rejected "the district court's' apparent
reasoning that the payment of premiums alone is sufficient to create a
plan ....",140
The district court had relied almost exclusively on a Secretary of
Labor regulation which provided that the term "employee welfare benefit
plan" does not include a group insurance program offered by an insurer
to employees under which (1) the employer makes no contributions, (2)
employee participation is completely voluntary, (3) the employer's sole
functions are to advertise the availability of the plan, and (4) the
employer receives no consideration.' 4 In criticizing the district court's
construction of the regulation, the court explained:
On a literal reading of the court's opinion, the court appears
to have construed the regulation to say that if any one of the
four listed factors does not appear, then the insurance program
is included within the definition of an employee welfare benefit
plan .... This reading of the regulation, we admit, is not

compelled by the language of the regulation itself. That is, the
language, [sic] compels only the reading that the four conditions
are jointly sufficient for exclusion; it does not compel the reading
that the conditions are also individually necessary for exclusion.
On the other hand, neither is this reading of the regulation

139. Id. at 352.
140. Id.at 353.
141. The pertinent Secretary of Labor regulation provides:
[Tlhe terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" shall not
include a group or group-type insurance program offered by an insurer to
employees or members of an employee organization, under which
(1)No contributions are made by an employer or employee organization;
(2) Participation in the program is completely voluntary for employees or
members;
(3) The sole functions of the employer or employee organization with respect
to the program are, without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer to
publicize the program to employees or members, to collect premiums through
payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer; and
(4) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the
form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable
compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services actually rendered
in connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-10) (1991).
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necessarily precluded by the language of the regulation either.
However, . . . Fifth Circuit precedent precludes any interpretation of the regulation that leads to the conclusion that the
employer's contribution of premiums alone is sufficient to create
42
a group health plan.'
Thus, not only did the Kidder court display a peculiar ambivalence
toward its own reasoning, but it seemed determined to preserve the
Taggart principle that ERISA does not regulate "bare purchases of
health insurance . *."..
,4 Although the court fell far short of requiring
the existence of plan assets as a prerequisite to ERISA coverage, it
nevertheless revealed doubts regarding Donovan's implication that virtually all employee group health programs, whether self-insured or insured, are ERISA plans. Most importantly, Kidder apparently refused
to slam the door on the possibility that future courts may seek an
interpretation of ERISA which is more consistent with its "history,
structure and purposes. ..."
IV.

ANALYSIS

Taggart and Donovan and their respective progeny represent two
extreme interpretations of ERISA's definition of "employee welfare
benefit plan." ' 45 On the one hand, the Taggart court liberally construed
the statute to accomplish ERISA's goal of protecting plan assets. Under
the Taggart interpretation, a plan with no assets, such as an insured
plan, lies outside the scope of ERISA's coverage because "[tihere simply
exist no assets for ERISA's statutory safeguards to protect."'4 The
Donovan court, on the other hand, strictly construed the statute without
considering whether its intepretation promoted or defeated the specific
goals Congress sought to achieve. Whereas the Taggart court noted that
"Congress has ... chosen to treat ['health plans' and 'health insurance']
separately, ' ' 47 the Donovan court merely pointed out that according to
the statute an ERISA plan may be established "'through the purchase

of insurance or otherwise

... ."',141

As a consequence, the Donovan

142. Kidder v. H & B Marine, Inc., 932 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1991) (footnote
omitted), citing Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211
(5th Cir. 1980), Brady v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 732 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. La.),
rev'd without opinion, 915 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1990), and Clark v. Golden Rule Ins. Co.,
737 F. Supp. 376, 381-83 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1989).
143. Taggart, 617 F.2d at 1211.
144. Id.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). See supra note 5.
146. Taggart, 617 F.2d at 1211.
147. Id., referring to I.R.C. §§ 105(a), 105(e).
148. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371 (1lth Cir. 1982), quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(l) (1976).
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interpretation permits no distinctions between insured and self-insured
plans, resulting in the virtual inability of courts "to declare any policy
anything other than an ERISA plan. ... ,,49
While the Taggart court, unlike the Donovan court, at least considered ERISA's goal of protecting workers from abuse of plan assets
by plan administrators, neither court considered ERISA as a whole in
interpreting the definition of "employee welfare benefit plan."' 50 Since
an adequate interpretation of the provision must take into account all
goals and policies Congress sought to promote in enacting ERISA, neither
court's interpretation is satisfactory. In addition to the goal of protecting
workers from abuse of plan assets, a competing goal of ERISA is to
encourage the formation of employee benefit plans. 5 ' Thus, in determining whether an employer has established an ERISA plan, a court
should consider the degree to which its decision will accommodate each
of these goals. Furthermore, the court's analysis should necessarily involve an evaluation of the impact of ERISA's preemption and civil
enforcement provisions in light of the facts of each case.
Such an analysis will show that any interpretation of ERISA which
includes insurance policies purchased by small employers fails to promote
ERISA's goals. As applied to insured plans, ERISA fails to adequately
protect workers' benefits from abuses by insurers because of the limited
remedies available to claimants under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. As applied to small employers, ERISA fails to encourage the
formation of employee benefit plans because the need for small employers
to be protected from multiple and conflicting state laws is minimal. In
short, where a case involves both a small employer and an insured plan,
application of ERISA promotes neither of ERISA's goals and actually
serves to defeat those goals.
A. ERISA Applied to Insured Plans
Unlike employers who establish and maintain self-insured employee
benefit plans, employers who merely purchase insurance for their employees have little, if any, opportunity to abuse plan assets. The Taggart
court relied on this distincition in declaring that ERISA does not regulate
"bare purchases of health insurance where . . .the purchasing employer

neither directly nor indirectly owns, controls, administers or assumes
responsibility for the policy or its benefits."' 52 The Taggart reasoning

149.

Brady v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 732 F. Supp. 678, 680 n.l (W.D. La.),

rev'd without opinion, 915 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1990); see supra note 6.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l) (1988).
151. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
152. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S.Ct. 1739 (1981).
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implies that Congress designed ERISA to protect workers' benefits from
abuses by employers who actually own all or part of the insurance funds
and act as administrators, managers, or trustees of those funds, who
decide how to invest the funds and whether or not to grant claims, and
who are subject to suit by employees whose claims are denied.' s Employers who establish and maintain self-insured plans fit that description,
so they should fall within the scope of ERISA's coverage.
In contrast, employers who merely purchase insurance receive no
funds to abuse; rather, they receive insurance policies and usually some
enrollment forms or claim forms to distribute to their employees. Although such employers may collect premiums through payroll deductions
and may contribute a portion of each employee's premium, they have
no discretion over how to invest the premiums-they must forward the
premiums to insurance companies either directly or through METs. The
insurance funds remain in the hands of insurance companies and are
not subject to employer abuse. Therefore, as Taggart recognized, employers who establish insured plans are not within the purview of ERISA's primary goal-i.e., the protection of workers from "abuses
4
occurring in respect of private pension [and health insurance] assets.'
It may be argued that, as applied to insured plans, ERISA protects
workers' benefits from insurer abuse rather than employer abuse. After
all, insurers define the terms of insurance contracts and determine whether
or not to grant claims for benefits. Additionally, insurers operate under
an inherent conflict of interest which is absent where employers administer self-insured plans. One court explained as follows:
Because an insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from
its own assets rather than the assets of a trust, its fiduciary role
lies in perpetual conflict with its profit-making role as a business.
That is, when an insurance company serves as ERISA fiduciary
to a plan composed solely of a policy or contract issued by
that company, it is exercising discretion over a situation for
which it incurs "direct, immediate expense as a result of benefit
determinations favorable to [pilan participants."' 5
The argument that ERISA protects workers from insurer abuse is
weak, however, for at least two reasons. First, ERISA does not regulate
the substantive terms of insurance contracts.'5 6 Only state laws protect

153.

See supra note 6 and note 126 and accompanying text.

154. Taggart, 617 F.2d at 1211.
155. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir.

1990) (holding that insurer's inherent conflict of interest made deferential standard of
review inappropriate), quoting DeNobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1191 (4th Cir.
1989).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
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workers from inequitable provisions in insurance policies. Such laws
"regulate insurance" within the meaning of the savings clause'" and
the McCarran-Ferguson Act," 8 and therefore they are saved from preemption. At the same time, those laws are preempted when applied to
self-insured plans because of the deemer clause. 5 9 As noted in Metro-

politan, 60 the distinction between insured and self insured plans
is one
"Congress is aware of and one it has chosen not to alter."' 16'
The second weakness in the argument that ERISA protects workers
from abuses by insurers stems from the fact that even though ERISA

provides a cause of action to recover benefits due, it does not adequately
protect workers from insurers who wrongfully deny claims. 62 As the

Court explained in Pilot Life,

6

ERISA's civil enforcement scheme is

exclusive; therefore, the Act preempts all state remedies for bad faith

or breach of contract.'" Consequently, workers under insured as well
as self-insured plans remain uncompensated for damages resulting from
improper claims processing by insurers or, in the case of self-insured

plans, plan administrators. Yet, because of the inherent conflict of
interest under which insurance companies operate, the potential for
insurer misconduct in insured plans is even greater than the potential

for employer misconduct in self-insured plans.

65

ERISA, nonetheless,

permits no remedies for damages caused by an insurer's wrongful denial

of claims.
Thus, courts which interpret ERISA to include insured plans do not
promote ERISA's goal of protecting workers' benefits from abuse.'"6

157. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988). See supra note 41 and text accompanying notes
47-50.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1988). See supra note 41 and text accompanying notes 4750.
159. 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(B) (1988). See supra text accompanying note 42.
160. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380
(1985).
161. Id. at 747, 105 S. Ct. at 2393.
162. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
163. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987).
164. Id. at 54, 107 S. Ct. at 1556-57. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
165. See supra text accompanying note 155.
166. Justice Doggett of the Texas Supreme Court has lamented the "deplorable demise
of state-given rights" which results from the Pilot Life Court's holding that ERISA's
civil enforcement scheme is exclusive. Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d
387, 391-92 (Tex. 1991) (Doggett, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying note 16.
Says Justice Doggett:
By its reading of ERISA's preemption clause, the United States Supreme Court
has restricted the very rights of employees-to avoid the delay or denial of
benefits-that Congress sought to protect. Through peculiar federal judicial
interpretation, a statutory addition to workers' rights has been converted into
a statutory removal of those rights. The law has been reshaped into a form

19921

COMMENTS

Courts would better serve that goal by following Taggart's lead in
excluding insured plans from ERISA coverage, thereby freeing workers
to choose from among the wide array of state causes of action available
in most cases. Furthermore, permitting states to regulate claims processing should result in greater deterrence of insurer misconduct simply
because state laws provide claimants with more causes of action and
remedies than ERISA. The Taggart reasoning is also more consistent
with the deference shown by Congress toward state regulation of insurance as evidenced by the savings clause 67 and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act'.10

Nevertheless, despite ERISA's failure to adequately protect participants and beneficiaries of insured plans, exclusion of insured plans
from ERISA coverage in all cases may not be prudent. Courts also
should take into account ERISA's second major goal-i.e., encouraging
the formation of employee benefit plans. 69 By establishing uniform laws
regulating employee benefit plans, ERISA protects employers from multiple and conflicting state laws and facilitates the administration of plans
covering employees in more than one state, thereby encouraging the
formation of such plans. 7 0 As suggested in Pilot Life, the restricted
choice of causes of action and attendant remedies available to claimants
under ERISA's civil enforcement scheme represents a balancing of the
individual's need to settle claims against the public need to encourage
the formation of employee benefit plans.' Therefore, where the public
need to encourage the formation of employee benefit plans outweighs
the employees' need for the greater protection of state laws, inclusion
of insured plans within the scope of ERISA is justified.
Such a case exists where an employer seeks to purchase group health
insurance for employees in more than one state. Absent ERISA's uniform
standards to guide processing of claims, the insurer and possibly the
employer would be subject to differing regulatory requirements in different states.' The result would be increased administrative costs and
ultimately higher premiums and fewer benefits for workers.'17 Arguably,

the public need to reduce this administrative burden on insurers, emthat achieves the converse of its original purpose.
Id. at 392. See also Biggs, supra note 11; Aldisert, Note, supra note 11.
167. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988). See supra text accompanying note 41.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1988). See supra text accompanying note 45.
169. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
170. Id.
171. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1556 (1987).

172. See supra note 29.
173. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 408 (1990) ("To require plan
providers to design their programs in an environment of differing State regulations would
complicate the administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers
might offset with decreased benefits").
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ployers, and employees outweighs the need of employees for the added
protection of state laws. In such cases, ERISA's uniform regulations
may indeed serve to encourage employers to purchase group health
insurance for their employees.
Thus, to the extent ERISA is necessary to encourage employers to
provide group health insurance for their employees, insured plans as
well as self-insured plans should fall within the scope of ERISA. As
the next section of this comment will show, however, small-employer
plans fail to meet this test.
B. ERISA Applied to Small Employers
Since small employers rarely, if ever, have the resources to establish
self-insured plans,' 17 4 they must purchase insurance if they want to provide
health benefits for their employees. Consequently, all of the shortcomings
discussed in the previous section concerning ERISA as applied to insured
plans are also relevent to an analysis of ERISA as applied to small
employers. In other words, ERISA fails to protect employees of small
employers from abuse of plan assets because there are no assets to
protect. Nor does ERISA, as opposed to state law, offer these employees
adequate remedies for wrongful denial of claims by insurers. Finally,
ERISA coverage of small-employer plans is justified only when the public
need to encourage small employers to purchase employee group health
insurance outweighs the employees' need for the added protection of
state laws.
It follows that where a small employer is involved, the inquiry must
focus on whether ERISA is necessary to encourage the employer to
provide group health insurance for its employees. In the vast majority
of cases, ERISA is unnecessary to achieve that goal.
First of all, small employers typically do not conduct business across
state lines. Unlike large interstate employers, they are not subject to
the administrative burdens caused by multiple and conflicting state laws.
Therefore, ERISA's uniform regulations, which Congress designed to
relieve those burdens, are not a significant inducement to small employers
to provide group health insurance for their employees.
Furthermore, ERISA does not substantially reduce the administrative
costs of insurers of small-employer plans. Although insurers may do
business among many states, the savings clause nevertheless renders them
subject to multiple and conflicting state laws which regulate the substantive content of insurance contracts.1'" This means that the substantive
terms of all policies issued in a particular state must conform with that

174. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.

175. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
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state's insurance laws. Thus, insurers should encounter no great obstacles
in also adapting their administrative practices to conform with laws
regulating the processing of claims (laws which otherwise are preempted
by ERISA) in the state where the employer does business. Also, most
insurers customarily issue non-employee group health policies and individual policies not covered by ERISA. Since these types of policies
are subject to all the laws of particular states, the insurers should already
be familiar with and have mechanisms for complying with those laws.
In short, ERISA is unnecessary to control the administrative costs of
insurers of small-employer plans.
Whether one looks at the effects of ERISA on small employers
themselves or on the insurers of small-employer plans, it becomes clear
that ERISA offers little to encourage small employers to provide group
health insurance for their employees. ERISA's uniform regulations do
not reduce any existing administrative burdens on small employers, nor
do those regulations substantially reduce the administrative costs of
insurers of small-employer plans.
As applied to small employers, then, ERISA fails to meet the public
need to encourage the formation of employee benefit plans. Consequently, this public need is outweighed by the need of individual claimants to have access to the wide array of state causes of action and
remedies. ERISA coverage of small employers therefore cannot be justified.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to achieve the goals of ERISA as intended by Congress,
courts must interpret ERISA's definition of "employee welfare benefit
plan" 7 6 in light of the Act as a whole. The problem is that courts are
faced with the strict construction advanced in Donovan'7 in the Eleventh
Circuit and adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Memorial Hospital."' As a
result, the law as it now stands represents an interpretation of ERISA
which, when applied to small-employer plans, fails to promote the Act's
dual goals of protecting employee benefits from abuse and encouraging

the formation of employee benefit plans. Therefore, in the absence of
congressional amendment of ERISA to correct the problem, courts should
adapt this jurisprudence to effect the purposes of ERISA and to avoid
the injustice of needlessly restricting the remedies available to employees.
In the Fifth Circuit, the present test for determining whether an
employer has "established or maintained"' 79 an employee welfare benefit

176.
177.
178.
179.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). See supra note 5.
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982).
Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).

1002

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 52

plan was expressed most clearly in Gahn v. Allstate Life InsuranceCo.1'0
According to Gahn, a court must conduct two inquiries.' First, the
court must apply the Secretary of Labor's safe-harbor provision." 2 According to. that provision, ERISA does not cover a plan if (1) the
employer makes no contributions, (2) employee participation is completely voluntary, (3) the employer's sole functions are to advertise the
s3
availability of the plan, and (4) the employer receives no consideration."
Usually, in small-employer plans, employee participation is voluntary
and the employer receives no consideration; therefore, small employers
escape factors (2) and (4). However, insurers often require employers
to contribute a percentage of employee premiums as a prerequisite' to
obtaining group rates, and many courts have found such "contributions"
by employers to meet the first factor of the safe-harbor provision.",
Kidder strongly rejected the notion "that the employer's contribution
of premiums alone is sufficient to create a group health plan,""' but
concluded that an employer's "payment of premiums on behalf of its
employees is 'substantial evidence that a plan, fund, or program [was)
established."' '1 6 Courts also have found the third factor to be satisfied
where employers distribute application and claim forms, make payroll
deductions for premiums, and update enrollment information." 7
If the court finds that any of the above factors has been met, then
the plan does not qualify for exemption from ERISA coverage under
the safe-harbor provision, and the court must proceed to the second
inquiry."' This inquiry is the Donovan test of "whether, "'from the
surrounding circumstances[,J a reasonable person can ascertain the intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and

180. 926 F.2d 1449, 1452 (5th Cit. 1991). Gahn was decided less than three weeks
before Kidder v. H & B Marine, Inc., 932 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1991) (Thornberry, J.),
see supra text accompanying notes 136-44, but was not cited in the latter opinion. After
stating the test for deciding whether an employer has established or maintained an ERISA
plan, the Gahn court remanded the case to the district court for further factual findings
relevant to the determination.
181. Gahn, 926 F.2d at 1452.
182. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-10) (1991). See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
183. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-16) (1991).
184. See, e.g., Cote v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 754 F. Supp 18, 21 (D. Conn. 1991);
Foxworth v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 745 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (S.D. Miss. 1990); Dodd
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 564, 567-68 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
185. Kidder v. H & B Marine, 932 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cit. 1991).
186. Id., quoting Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (Ilth Cit. 1982).
187. See, e.g., Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492-93 (9th
Cir. 1988); Holcomb v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.. 754 F. Supp. 524, 528 (N.D. Miss. 1991);
Cote, 754 F. Supp. at 21; Foxworth, 745 F. Supp. at 1231; Dodd, 688 F. Supp. at 56768.
188. Gahn v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 926 F.2d 1449, 1452 (5th Cit. 1991).
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procedures for receiving benefits.' '. ' .189 Of course, as seen in the cases,
an ERISA plan has been found in almost every instance where the
Donovan test has been applied, whether the plan at issue was insured,
self-insured, large, or small.'19
The analysis in Part IV revealed that Donovan's strict construction
of ERISA fails to promote ERISA's goals when applied to small-employer plans. Thus, if courts are to interpret ERISA in a way which
avoids injustice and which effects the goals Congress intended to achieve,
the Donovan test cannot be the final inquiry in the determination of
whether an ERISA plan exists in a particular case.
As an aid to formulating yet a third inquiry, Taggart offers a
reliable guide insofar as it implies that courts should consider the "history, structure and purposes of ERISA""'9 in making their determinations. The means of implementing such a consideration of ERISA's
"history, structure and purposes" can be derived from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Pilot Life.'9 According to the Pilot Life Court,
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme "represents a careful balancing of
the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against public
interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans."' 93
From this statement emerges a useful measure of whether application
of ERISA in a particular case promotes the goals of the Act. If the
careful balance of individual needs against the public interest is upset
by the application of ERISA, then application of ERISA in such a case
does not promote the Act's goals.
Thus, even if a plan does not qualify for exemption from ERISA
coverage under the Secretary of Labor's safe-harbor provision, and even
if a plan satisfies the elements of the Donovan test, the plan still should
meet the balancing test derived from Pilot Life in order to qualify as
an ERISA plan. Under that balancing test, a health insurance plan is
not an ERISA plan unless application of ERISA is necessary to encourage
the employer to provide insurance for its employees. When ERISA is
not necessary for that purpose, the employees' need. for the added
protection of state laws outweighs the public interest in encouraging the
formation of employee benefit plans. In such a case, the court should

189. Id., quoting Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236,
240 (5th Cir. 1990), quoting Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir.
1982). See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp., 904 F.2d at 243; Foxworth, 745 F. Supp. at 1230.
See also California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544, 1545-46 (D.C. Cal.
1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1985).
191. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir.
1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S. Ct. 1739 (1981).
192. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987).
193. Id. at 54, 107 S.Ct. at 1556.
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find that the employer did not establish or maintain an employee welfare
benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA.
Since ERISA is not necessary to encourage small employers to

provide group health insurance to their employees, the need of these
employees for the added protection of state laws outweighs the public
interest in encouraging small employers to purchase insurance. Thus,
the balancing test permits small-employer plans to slip through the wide
net of the Donovan test, thereby enabling courts to avoid the injustice

resulting from needless preemption of a claimant's state causes of action
and remedies. Another advantage of adding this balancing test to the

two-step inquiry enunciated in Gahn is that it will correct the problem
created by Donovan and its progeny without overruling any of those
cases.
Congressional amendment of ERISA offers an alternative solution
to the problems created by application of ERISA to small-employer
plans. Such an amendment could simply exclude small employers who
conduct business in a single state, or employers with fewer than a certain
number of employees, from the definition of "employee welfare benefit

plan."191
VI.

CONCLUSION

Congress enacted ERISA in order to correct two specific problems:
the first problem concerned abuses of assets held in trust by employers
for the benefit of employees; the second concerned inconsistent and
conflicting state laws which created administrative burdens on employers
who chose to establish benefit plans for employees in more than one
state. 19' Presumably, Congress intended ERISA to regulate only those
types of employee benefit plans susceptible to these problems, such as
pension plans and self-insured welfare benefit plans. On the other hand,
as Taggart'" recognized, it is unlikely that Congress intended ERISA's
vesting standards, funding requirements, termination insurance, reporting
and disclosure guidelines, and fiduciary obligations to apply to insured

194. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l) (1988). Congress has already taken a step in this direction
by excluding some small employers from the provisions of the Comprehensive Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"). Id. §§ 1161-68. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. COBRA requires employers to provide continuation health coverage
to employees who leave work under certain circumstances, but employers which "employed
fewer than 20 employees on a typical business day during the preceding calendar year"
are exempted from this requirement. Id. § 1161(b). Although COBRA's small-employer
exemption is almost certainly too narrow for adoption by ERISA generally, itcould serve
as a model for a broader provision exempting small employers from ERISA as a whole.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
196. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208, (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S. Ct. 1739 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes
98-112.
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health plans in which "[tihere simply exist no assets for ERISA's statutory safeguards to protect.""97 It is also unlikely that Congress intended
ERISA's preemption provisions and uniform regulations to reduce administrative burdens on insured plans covering employees in only one
state. In fact, Congress had already reserved to the states the power to
regulate insurance in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 98
Yet, some courts apparently have interpreted ERISA's provisions
without reference to Congress's intent. Such an interpretation is most
conspicuous in Donovan's'" construction of ERISA's definition of "employee welfare benefit plan.""* Under the Donovan "test,"' ' a health
insurance policy is an ERISA plan based on the mere fact that an
employer has purchased the insurance for the benefit of employees.
Taggart and its progeny at least acknowledged that, as applied to insured
plans, strict construction of the definition would not promote ERISA's
goal of protecting plan assets from abuse. Nevertheless, when the Fifth
Circuit adopted the Donovan test in Memorial Hospital,2 it effectively
abandoned its earlier interpretation of ERISA as expressed in Taggart.
Soon after Memorial Hospital, however, the Fifth Circuit in Kidder"'t
revealed doubts regarding Donovan's implication that virtually all employee group health programs, whether self-insured or insured, are ERISA plans. Although the Kidder court proceeded to apply the Donovan
test to the facts before it, the court seemed anxious to preserve the
Taggart principle that ERISA does not regulate "bare purchases of
health insurance."'" In effect, Kidder paves the way for future courts
to reconcile the widely divergent approaches to ERISA represented by
Taggart and Donovan.
In an effort to assist courts in adapting existing jurisprudence toward
the achievement of ERISA's goals, this comment has proposed an interpretation of ERISA's definition of "employee welfare benefit plan"201
which considers the "history, structure and purposes" 2 of the Act as

197. Taggart, 617 F.2d at 1211.
198. IS U.S.C. 01oll et seq. (1988). See supra text accompanying note 45.
199. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 113-21.
200. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). See supra note 5.
201. Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1373. See supra text accompanying note 118.
202. Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990).
See supra text accompanying notes 129-35.
203. Kidder v. H & B Marine, Inc., 932 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1991). See supra text
accompanying notes 136-44.
204. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S. Ct. 1739 (1981).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(I) (1988). See supra note 5.
206. Taggart, 617 F.2d at 1211.
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a whole. Under this interpretation, an employee group health insurance
plan should not be characterized as an ERISA plan unless to do so
would promote ERISA's dual goals of protecting workers' benefits and
encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. Because these
goals are competing, the determination of whether a particular plan is
governed by ERISA involves the application of a balancing test in which
the public need to encourage the formation of employee benefit plans
is weighed against the employees' need for the protection of state law. 07
Thus, where ERISA's uniform regulations are necessary to reduce administrative and economic burdens on insurers, employers, and employees, this need can be said to outweigh the employees' need for
access to state law remedies. In such cases, ERISA coverage of the plan
is consistent with the Act's purposes and is therefore appropriate.
Under this analysis, however, ERISA coverage of small-employer
plans is rarely justified. First of all, small employers usually purchase
insurance rather than establish self-insured plans, so they receive none
of the funds ERISA was designed to protect.0 ' At the same time, because
insurers own the funds out of which claims are paid, they operate under
an inherent conflict of interest which increases the potential for misconduct in claims handling. 2°9 Since ERISA provides no remedies for
'
damages caused by an insurer's wrongful denial of claims 210
employees
under small-employer plans have a great need for access to the wide
array of state law remedies. Meanwhile, under ERISA, the same employees would be left virtually unprotected. In other words, when applied
to small-employer plans, ERISA fails to achieve its goal of protecting
workers' benefits.
ERISA also fails to encourage small employers to establish employee
benefit plans. Since small employers typically do not conduct business
across state lines, they are not subject to inconsistent and conflicting
state laws. Whether one looks at the effects of ERISA on small employers
themselves or on the insurers of small-employer plans, ERISA's uniform
regulations do not reduce any existing administrative burdens on small
employers, nor do those regulations substantially reduce the administrative costs of insurers of small-employer plans.2 " Thus, any need for
ERISA to encourage small employers to form employee benefit plans
is minimal.
Accordingly, under the proposed balancing test, ERISA should not
apply to small-employer group health insurance plans because the min-

207.
208.
209.

See supra text accompanying notes 176-94.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 155.

210. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
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imal need for ERISA to encourage small employers to form employee
benefit plans is outweighed in such cases by the great need of employees
for the added protection of state law.
Jack E. Morris

